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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, presiding.

Judgment

was entered on August 10, 1987, and was amended on September 8,
1987.

The amended judgment was in defendant-respondent

Robinson Brick Company?s favor on all claims and its
counterclaim.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of

Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter

of law, that Beehive Brick Company's "million brick order" was
not supported by a written memorandum within the meaning of the
statute of frauds?
2.

Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter

of law, that the alleged oral contract for a distributorship
was unsupported by a written memorandum as required by the
statute of frauds?
3.

Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter

of law, that there must be an enforceable contract to support a
claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
4.

Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter

of law, that Robinson Brick Company has not interfered with
Beehive Brick Company's customer contracts?

5.

Did the District Court correctly hold, as a matter

of law, that Beehive Brick Company never provided Robinson
Brick Company with goods or services?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, § 70A-1-203:
Obligation of good faith. Every contract or duty
within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201:
Formal requirements - Statute of frauds. (1) Except
as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against
the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection
(1) against such party unless written notice of objection to
its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other
respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially
manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for
sale to others in the ordinary course of the sellerTs
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation
is received and under circumstances which reasonably
indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made
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either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the
contract is not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted (section 70A-2-606).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-206:
Offer and acceptance in formation of contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship
or by the prompt or current shipment of non-conforming
goods, but such a shipment of nonconforming goods does
not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only
as an accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is
a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified
of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as
having lapsed before acceptance.
Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the
court determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award
just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable
attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
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(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate
representation. The court may impose appropriate sanctions
against any counsel who inadequately represents a client on
appeal.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in part):
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing* The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
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but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant Beehive Brick Company (hereinafter
"Beehive") commenced this action in the Third Judicial District
Court on August 8, 1986, claiming that defendant-respondent
Robinson Brick Company (hereinafter "Robinson") breached
contract obligations and caused damage to Beehive.

(R. 2-8)

On September 17, 1986 Robinson counterclaimed, alleging that
Beehive's open account in the amount of $29,393.01 was past
due.

(R. 20-21)

Following discovery, Robinson moved for

summary judgment in its favor as to all of the claims appearing
in the complaint and as to Robinson's counterclaim.
(R. 32-35)

On August 10, 1987, the District Court granted

Robinson's motion in its entirety.

(R. 75-77)

Subsequently,

the court entered an amended summary judgment that adjusted the
rate of interest on the counterclaim judgment.

(R. 86-88)

Beehive filed its notice of appeal on September 16, 1987.
(R. 91-92)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Robinson seeks an order of the Court affirming the
judgment of the District Court.

Robinson also seeks to recover

attorneys' fees incurred in responding to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The statement of facts appearing in Beehive's brief
misstates or distorts important facts and omits many undisputed
facts which were dispositive of the issues before the District
Court.
1.

Robinson offers the following brief statement of facts.
Beehive's Temporary Distributorship With Robinson.
In April 1985, Beehive contacted Robinson regarding

the possibility of its selling bricks manufactured by Robinson
in Denver, Colorado.

(RB 95 at 18; R. 94 at 30)

In response

to this request, Robinson granted Beehive a temporary
distributorship.

(R. 95 at 18; R. 96 at 75-77; R. 94 at 38)

Pursuant to this temporary arrangement, Beehive bought goods on
account from Robinson and then resold them to Beehive's
customers in Utah.

(R. 96 at 46-48) Robinson agreed to supply

Beehive with bricks until Robinson could appoint a permanent
distributor for its products in Utah.

(R. 95 at 18; R. 96 at

75-77; R. 94 at 38) From April 1985 until July 1985, in
response to orders placed in writing by Beehive, Robinson sold
bricks to Beehive on account.
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(R. 96 at 46-48 & Ex. 16)

In July 1985, Robinson told Beehive that the temporary
distributorship would be terminated because Interstate Brick
Company had been selected as Robinson1s distributor in Utah.
(R. 96 at 81-82 & Ex. 13; R. 94 at 45)

To allow Beehive a

transition period to meet all of its commitments for Robinson's
products, Robinson allowed Beehive until October 15, 1985 to
place bona fide orders for bricks from Robinson; Robinson
advised Beehive that it would not accept new orders after that
date.

(R. 95 at 22-23; R. 96 at 82; R. 94 at 45)
In its brief to the Court, Beehive contends that in

March 1986, Robinson promised Beehive it would be awarded a
non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson products.

(R. 95 at

55-56) Robinsonfs representative denies ever having promised
Beehive a distributorship beyond the temporary distributorship
in effect during the spring and summer of 1985.

(R. 94 at 75)

But more significantly for purposes of the District Court's
ruling, according to Beehive's representative, Robinson never
agreed in writing to grant Beehive a distributorship in 1986.
(R. 95 at 54-56)
2.

Beehive's Alleged Order of One Million Bricks.
One day before the end of the phase-out period of the

temporary distributorship, Dee Young, Beehive's sales manager,
advised Monte Jones, Robinson's manager of distributor sales,
that Beehive wished to purchase approximately one million
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bricks from Robinson composed of bricks of a certain color and
texture that would have to be developed specifically for
Beehive's customer.

(R. 96 at 84-86; R. 95 at 23-28; R. 94 at

49-51) At the time this order was placed, the price for one
million bricks was more than $500.

(R. 96 at Ex. 8-11)

In the

Court below, Beehive contended that, if the special color and
texture could not successfully be manufactured, it would have
accepted bricks kept in stock (R. 96 at 84-86).

In any event,

however, both parties knew that Robinson was supposed to
attempt to produce a brick of a texture and color that had not
been produced by Robinson for several years, called "Provincial
Antique."

(R. 94 at 73-75)

Beehive claims to have sent Robinson an order in
writing for the so-called one million brick order.

(R. 96 at

29 & Ex. 7) Robinson claims not to have received any written
order.

(R. 94 at 51) Robinson's manager of distributor sales,

however, discussed Beehive's desire for one million bricks over
the telephone.

(R. 94 at 49, 51, 71)

The writing which

Beehive allegedly sent to Robinson to order the one million
bricks was a Beehive purchase order form.
stated:

Beehive's form

"[This purchase order] must be confirmed in writing by

authorized selling agent from vendor's office."
Ex. 7)

(R. 96 at

The alleged million brick order was never confirmed in

writing by Robinson -- there exists no writing by which
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Robinson confirmed that it would provide the million bricks to
Beehive, that it would do so over a period of one year, or that
it would be able to produce the type of bricks that Beehive
wished it to produce.

(R. 96 at 54 & Ex. 1-16; R. 94 at 81-82)

Between October 1985 and February 1986, Robinson
attempted on three separate occasions to manufacture bricks of
a color and texture that would be satisfactory to Beehive and
its customer.

Specifically, in November 1986, Robinson made a

test run of 50,000 Provincial Antique bricks, sending a sample
to Beehive.

In January 1986, Robinson made another test run of

150,000 Provincial Antique bricks, again sending a sample to
Beehive.

In late January and early February 1986, Robinson

completed a third test run of 200,000 Provincial Antique
bricks, again sending a sample to Beehive.

(R. 95 at 41-46;

R. 94 at 73-74) All of the test runs manufactured by Robinson
were unsatisfactory to Beehive for purposes of fulfilling the
million brick order.

(R. 95 at 41-46; R. 96 at 88; R. 94 at

73-74)
Following these three unsuccessful attempts to
manufacture a satisfactory brick for Beehive's million brick
order, on April 17, 1986, Robinson advised Beehive that it was
unable to produce the type of Provincial Antique brick that
Beehive and its customer wished.

(R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14)

Robinson told Beehive, however, that it would allow Beehive to
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take delivery until May 16, 1986 of other types of brick in
Robinson's inventory as a substitute for the Provincial Antique
bricks.

(R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14) Robinson also told Beehive

that it would have until May 16, 1986 to pick up all of its
remaining orders with Robinson.
3.

(R. 96 at 90-92 & Ex. 14)

Events Following Termination of the Distributorship.
After the relationship between Robinson and Beehive

terminated on April 17, 1986, Beehive never attempted to fill
the million brick order with another type of brick as a
substitute for the Provincial Antique bricks (R. 95 at 66),
although Beehive now claims that the substitute brick would
have been satisfactory from the beginning.

(Appellant's Brief

at 7)
As to Beehive's claims that Robinson caused Interstate
Brick to approach Emerson Larkin (Beehive's customer) in an
attempt to fill the one million brick order previously placed
by Beehive, the record does not support this assertion.
Rather, Beehive's president, Randall Browning, testified that
he had no personal knowledge of any effort by Robinson to
interfere with Beehive's contracts with customers.

(R. 96 at

118-19) Robinson's manager of distributor sales stated
unequivocally that Robinson did not contact Beehive's customers
in an effort to direct their business away from Beehive.
(R. 94 at 69)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Beehive claims that Robinson violated two alleged
contracts.

Specifically, Beehive claims that Robinson breached

an agreement to supply Beehive with one million bricks of a
certain color, texture and type.

Beehive also claims that

Robinson broke a promise to grant Beehive a non-exclusive
distributorship for Robinson products.

Beehive urges this

Court to find disputed factual issues relating to the existence
of, and compliance with, these two alleged agreements.
Beehive's argument must fail for one simple reason:

both of

the alleged agreements lack the support of a written memorandum
required by the statute of frauds.

Therefore, in accordance

with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1987), the alleged contracts
are not enforceable as a matter of law.
Beehive also claims that Robinson's failure to perform
the agreements in the time, place and manner required
constitutes a violation of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing inherent in all contracts, codified at Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1987).

It is fundamental, however,

that good faith in the making of a contract is not required by
section 1-203 of the commercial code.
as a matter of law.
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Beehive's argument fails

Beehive's final two arguments fail on the facts.
Beehive argues that there exist questions of fact regarding
actions by Robinson which have interfered with Beehive's
ability to perform its contracts.

Beehive also contends that

Robinson has been unjustly enriched by benefits which Beehive
has conferred upon Robinson.

However, Beehive has completely

failed to offer any specific facts to support these
assertions.

Under Rule 56(e), Beehive may not rest upon

allegations in its pleadings but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.

Beehive failed to demonstrate the existence of a

material and disputed fact relevant to these two issues, and
summary judgment was correctly entered.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE "MILLION BRICK ORDER" IS BARRED FROM ENFORCEMENT BY
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Beehive claims that Robinson breached an agreement to

supply Beehive with one million bricks of a certain color,
texture and type.

(R. 2.)

Beehive urges this Court

(Appellant's Brief at 11-22) to find disputed factual issues
relating to the existence of, and compliance with, the alleged
agreement.

Specifically, Beehive argues there exists a factual

dispute as to whether an order for one million bricks was
placed by Beehive and accepted by Robinson and/or confirmed in
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writing by Robinson, and whether the test sample of bricks
provided to Beehive by Robinson constituted partial performance
of the contract.

All of these issues, however, raise questions

of law, not fact, and were properly decided on summary judgment
by the District Court.

It is significant that Beehive has not

cited a single case authority in support of its position on
these legal issues.

All of the available authority contradicts

Beehive's position.
Beehive's first purported question of fact relates to
the so-called million brick order placed by Beehive.

Although

the parties dispute much of what transpired regarding this
order (such as whether the written order was ever received by
Robinson and the date of delivery required by the order) two
facts are undisputed.

First, the writing which Beehive claims

as the order was typed on a Beehive Brick purchase order form.
(R. 96 at 29 and Ex. 7; Appellant's Brief at 12-13)

Second,

the writing which Beehive claims confirms this order is a
letter dated April 17, 1986 from Monte S. Jones of Robinson
Brick Company to Randall Browning of Beehive Brick.
Appellant's Brief at 13-14)

(R. 61;

These writings are insufficient

within the meaning of the statute of frauds to support a
finding of an enforceable contract, as a matter of law.
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The statute of frauds in the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code requires that for a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more to be enforceable, two elements must be
satisfied:

1) there must exist an oral agreement, and 2) the

oral agreement must be reflected in a writing or a confirming
memorandum.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1987).

The million

brick order fails on both counts.
Any obligation that Robinson had to supply Beehive
with one million bricks was contingent with its being able to
produce a brick acceptable to Beehive's customer.

(R. 94 at

73-75) However, the parties never reached an agreement as to
an acceptable color, texture and type of brick to fulfill the
million brick order.

Between October 1985 and February 1986,

Robinson attempted on three separate occasions to manufacture
bricks that would be satisfactory to Beehive and its customer.
(R. 95 at 41-46; R. 94 at 73-74) All of the test runs
manufactured by Robinson were unsatisfactory to Beehive and its
customer for purposes of fulfilling the million brick order.
(R. 95 at 41-46; R. 96 at 88; R. 94 at 73-74)

The parties

simply never reached an oral agreement as to a brick acceptable
for purposes of the million brick order.
Moreover, the "agreement," if any, between the parties
was never reduced to a writing sufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds.

Although Beehive claims to have sent
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Robinson a purchase order, the purchase order was never
confirmed in writing by Robinson,

Beehive's purchase order

itself is not a "confirmation" within the meaning of section
70A-2-201(2) because the purchase order stated that it "must be
confirmed in writing by authorized selling agent from vendor's
office,"

(R. 96 at Ex. 7). Courts construing this provision

of the U.C.C. have routinely held that a purchase order from
the buyer is insufficient against the seller where the purchase
order itself explicitly anticipates a confirmatory memorandum.
For example, in Nations Enterprises, Inc. v. Process
Equipment Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978), the
seller agreed orally to supply special-order goods.

The buyer

sent a purchase order that said it was not valid until
confirmed in writing by the seller.

The seller did not confirm

in writing but supplied a portion of the goods.

The buyer sued

for breach of contract as to the remaining goods.

The court

held, however, that the claim was barred by the statute of
frauds:
[The Buyer] also argues that its purchase order
is at least a confirmatory memorandum within the
meaning of [U.C.C. § 2-201(2)] which is
sufficient to bind [the seller] since written
objection to its contents was not received within
ten days . . . . [T]o constitute a sufficient
writing to take the oral contract outside the
statute of frauds, the writing must be "in
confirmation of the contract." Here, the
purchase order does not confirm that a contract
has been made. [Citations omitted] Rather, the
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purchase order, on its face, recognizes that
something more must be done before a contract
could come into existence.
579 P. 2d at 858.
conclusion.

Other courts have reached the same

E.g., Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut

Co., 721 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1983); FMC Finance Corp. v.
Reed, 592 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1979); American Web
Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 596 F.Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Colo.
1983); N. Dorman & Co., Inc. v. Noon Hour Food Products, Inc.,
501 F.Supp. 294, 297-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Intf1 Commodities
Export Co. v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep.
687 (1981).
Furthermore, Robinson's April 17, 1986 letter also
fails to satisfy the requirements for a confirming memorandum
under the statute of frauds because the writing did not
indicate that a contract had been made between the parties.

To

the contrary, the letter stated that the order for a special
color of bricks could not be fulfilled.

(R. 61)

Thus, the

letter is insufficient as a confirming memorandum under
subsections 1 and 2 of the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-201 (1987).

The letter is also insufficient under

subsection 3(a) of the statute of frauds, for specially
manufactured goods, which according to its terms only applies
when the seller of the goods, not the buyer, seeks to obviate
the statute of frauds defense.
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Global Truck & Equipment Co.,

Inc. v. Palmer Machine Works, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 641, 648 (N.D.
Miss. 1986).
Beehive also argues that the test samples of bricks
provided to Beehive by Robinson constituted partial performance
of the contract -- or at least raised disputed questions of
fact foreclosing summary judgment.

Beehive's argument seems to

be that if it accepted the sample goods, then there was an
enforceable contract under Section 70A-2-206, notwithstanding
the requirements of the statute of frauds.

Beehive's

contention that section 70A-2-206 works as an exception to the
statute of frauds rule found in section 70A-2-201 is completely
without merit.

By its terms, section 70A-2-201 is qualified

only as provided in that section, and not by other sections of
the Uniform Commercial Code.

Furthermore, the statute of

frauds provision itself addresses the part-performance
question.

Section 70A-2-201(3)(c) permits enforcement of an

otherwise unenforceable contract with respect to goods already
received and accepted.

However, this exception applies only to

that portion of the contract actually performed and does not
take the entire contract out of the statute of frauds; that is,
it validates the oral agreement only as to those goods actually
received and accepted by the buyer.

Bagby Land & Cattle Co.

v. California Livestock ComTn Co., 439 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1971); Spierling v. Fairmont Foods Co., 424 F.2d 337, 340 (7th
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Cir. 1980); Jessen v. Ashland Recreation Assoc, 204 Neb. 19,
281 N.W.2d 210, 213 (1979).

This exception allows Robinson to

enforce its counterclaim for payment as to goods actually
received and accepted by Beehive (which issue was not appealed
by Beehive), but does not take the entire contract out of the
statute of frauds.

See Nations Enterprises, 40 Colo. App.

390, 579 P.2d at 658.
Beehive's claim that Robinson breached an agreement to
supply Beehive with one million bricks is barred as a matter of
law.

The parties never reached an oral agreement as to an

acceptable color, texture and type of brick to fulfill the
million brick order.

Even if there was an oral agreement, it

was never reduced to a writing and there exists no confirming
memorandum within the meaning of the statute of frauds.
Finally, part performance of the contract validates the oral
agreement only as to those goods actually received and accepted
by the buyer, but does take the entire agreement out of the
statute of frauds.

The District Court correctly held that the

"million brick order" is barred by the statute of frauds.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT FOR A DISTRIBUTORSHIP IS
UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Beehive claims that Robinson broke an agreement to

grant Beehive a non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson
products.

(R. 4-5)

Beehive offers two documents in support of

its claim: a letter from Monte S. Jones dated July 22, 1985 and
the April 17, 1986 letter.

(Appellant's Brief at 23-24) Both

of these documents are inadequate as a matter of law under the
statute of frauds. Again, Beehive has not offered the Court a
single case in support of its position.
In Utah, as in other jurisdictions, a distributorship
agreement covering the sale of goods is governed by Article 2
of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code.

Quality Performance Lines,

Inc. v. Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Utah
1980).

As noted in Point I, supra, for a writing to satisfy

the statute of frauds found in Article 2 of the Commercial
Code, it must evidence the existence of an oral agreement.

If

it does not evidence a contract which has already come into
being, it is not a legally sufficient memorandum of agreement;
in the words of section 70A-2-201(l), the writing must
"indicate that a contract for sale has been made."

See 3

Bender's U.C.C. Service § 2.04[1], at 2-51 (1987).

In short,

although the statute of frauds does not require a writing which
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embodies all the essential terms of a contract, it does require
some writing that indicates that a contract for sale has been
made.
Neither of the documents offered by Beehive confirmed
that a contract or agreement of a permanent, non-exclusive
distributorship had been made.

Rather, the July 22, 1985

letter terminated the temporary distributorship relationship
without reference to any other agreement.

Similarly, the

April 17,> 1986 letter stated that the temporary distributorship
"must be entirely broken at this time."

The documents did not

indicate that an agreement to grant Beehive a non-exclusive
distributorship had been reached, and they are therefore
inadequate under the statute of frauds as a matter of law.
See 3 Bender's U.C.C. Service § 2.04[1], at 2-51 and cases
cited therein.
Beehive also claims that Robinson's admission of the
temporary distributorship arrangement took the alleged
agreement concerning a permanent distributorship out of the
statute of frauds by virtue of Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A~2-201(3)(b) (1987).

Apparently, Beehive argues that the

temporary distributorship and the permanent, non-exclusive
distributorship were one and the same, and that by admitting
that a temporary distributorship was granted, Robinson also
admitted that the non-exclusive distributorship was also agreed
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upon.

This simply is not true as a factual matter, and finds

no support in the record.

In fact, Beehive's officers

testified they understood that, although they were granted a
temporary distributorship in the Spring of 1985, at some point
a new exclusive distributor would be appointed.

(R. 96 at

75-76; R. 95 at 18-22)
Beehive's claim that Robinson broke an agreement to
grant Beehive a non-exclusive distributorship for Robinson
products is barred as a matter of law.

There exists no writing

within the meaning of the statute of frauds to support
Beehive's claim.

Robinson's admissions concerning the

temporary distributorship have no bearing on the alleged
permanent distributorship at issue in this case.

The District

Court correctly held that the purported oral agreement for a
non-exclusive distributorship is barred from enforcement by the
statute of frauds.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THERE MUST BE AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM
OF BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
In the Second Cause of Action of its complaint,

Beehive alleged that Robinson breached "the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts."

(R. 4) As

the factual basis for this contention, Beehive claimed that
Robinson "induced [Beehive] to expend time, money and other
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resources in the development and cultivation of a client basis
. • . and then refused to allow [Beehive] to meet said
contractual obligation to its clients and customers/'

(Id.)

In its brief to this Court, Beehive states that this claim was
intended to hold Robinson accountable for "those dealings which
exist prior to the formalization of the contract," and
specifically for Robinson's conduct during contract
negotiations.

(Appellant's Brief at 26)

It is again

significant that Beehive does not support its legal position
with a single case authority.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in contracts for the sale of goods is codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 (1987).

(R. 4)

It is fundamental

that a party's conduct in the making of a contract cannot be
held to violate this section of the Uniform Commercial Code
because, under the statute, the duty of good faith relates to
the contract's "performance or enforcement."

As one

commentator explained:
[T]he [good faith] standard is applicable to the
"performance and enforcement" of the contract,
which presumably excludes the matter of its
making. It is not a test to be used, for
example, when a fact known to one party but not
to the other is withheld at the time of executing
the agreement and there is no duty to disclose.
Such a fact may be important in considering
whether the transaction is unconscionable or not,
but the failure to disclose it to the other, even
when it is known that the other party would not
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enter the contract if he had knowledge of the
fact, would not of itself be a failure to meet
the Code's standard of good faith.
3 Bender's U.C.C. Service § 4.08[3], at 4-252 (1987).

The

Utah Supreme Court has found a duty of good faith performance
only where there is an enforceable contract relation.

See,

e.g., Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
306 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497,
505 (Utah 1980); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975).

Beehive's brief to this Court does not

explain how a covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be
implied in a contract that is not itself enforceable.
As established in points I and II supra, the alleged
agreements from which this cause stems are barred from
enforcement by the statute of frauds. As a matter of law,
therefore, there exists no contract to support such an implied
obligation.

The District Court properly dismissed Beehive's

argument; its theory has no support in law or in fact.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
ROBINSON DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BEEHIVE'S ABILITY TO
PERFORM ITS CONTRACTS.
Beehive argues that there exist disputed questions of

fact whether Robinson interfered with Beehive's ability to
perform its contracts with customers.

Beehive quotes a portion

of the testimony of Randall Browning in support of this claim
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(Appellant's Brief at 27), but leaves out the most critical
point.

The complete testimony on this issue follows:
(Q) My question to you, Mr. Browning, is whether you
have personal knowledge of any instance in which
Robinson Brick has instructed any of its
authorized agents to contact your customers.
A.

My response would be that the only instance that
we're referring to there is with Emerson Larkin„
He was contacted by Interstate Brick the day
following us being cut off as a distributor and
was asked to give his million brick order that he
had previously given to Beehive Brick, to
Interstate Brick and I think that the only source
that that could come from would be Robinson Brick.

Q.

You suppose that to be the case; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You don't have personal knowledge of any
communications between Robinson Brick and
Interstate Brick on that subject?

A.

No, I don't.

R. 96 at 118.
Under Rule 56(e), a party opposing summary judgment
may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials in his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."

If the opposing party does not

respond with specific facts properly supported, "summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."

Utah

R. Civ. P. 56(e); see, e.g., Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d
224 (Utah 1983); Thomock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979).
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That is precisely what happened in this case.

Beehive

offered no evidence to support its assertion that Robinson
interfered with business relations between Beehive and its
customers.

Beehive failed to demonstrate the existence of a

material and disputed factual issue, and judgment was correctly
entered by the District Court.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
BEEHIVE NEVER PROVIDED ROBINSON WITH GOODS OR SERVICES.
Beehive's final argument also fails on the facts.

Beehive contends (Appellant's Brief at 28-29) that Robinson was
unjustly enriched by benefits which Beehive conferred upon
Robinson.
this:

The "benefit" conferred upon Robinson amounted to

Beehive purchased bricks from Robinson and distributed

them in Utah.

The testimony of Beehive's president on the

issue was as follows:
(Q) My question to [you] is . . . what goods and
services, if any, did your company provide to
Robinson Brick Company?
A,

We did not provide goods. We did provide orders
to them for brick, for which they had agreed to
compensate us.

Q.

Well, isn't the usual way when you place an order
as a purchaser for the purchaser to pay the
seller rather than the seller to pay the
purchaser?

A.

Yes, that's probably true.
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Q.

Anything else besides orders that you provided to
them? Any other services that you provided to
Robinson Brick Company?

A.

Not that I'm aware of, no.

(R. 96 at 116-17)
As this testimony indicates, Beehive did not act as
Robinson's agent in performing services on its behalf.

To the

contrary, Beehive bought bricks from Robinson and resold them
to its own customers.

If (as Beehive's argument implies) every

purchaser of goods from a manufacturer is entitled to
remuneration for this "service," the commercial relationship
would be turned on its headc

Again, Beehive does not cite a

single authority that would support its novel argument.

There

is no factual basis for Beehive's contention that Robinson was
unjustly enriched as a result of the distributorship.
Beehive also argues that because it allegedly made a
special effort in order to win a permanent distributorship,
Robinson has somehow been unjustly enriched.

That Beehive

worked to win a permanent distributorship, however, is of no
consequence.

If it sold more bricks as a result of these

efforts, presumably it was paid for them by its customers.

The

record is silent concerning any tangible benefit conferred on
Robinson as the result of these efforts.

(R. 96 at 116-17)

Whether a party was unjustly enriched is determined by the
value of the benefit conferred on the defendant; neither the

-22-

detriment incurred by the plaintiff nor the reasonable value of
the plaintiff's services is relevant,

Davies v. Olson, 70

Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 45 (Ct. App. 1987).
Under Rule 56(e), Beehive may not rest upon mere
allegations but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Beehive has failed

to demonstrate the existence of a material and disputed fact
relevant to this issue.

The District Court did not err in

holding that Robinson was not unjustly enriched, as a matter of
law.

VI.

ROBINSON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED IN
RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL.
Robinson hereby requests its attorneys' fees incurred

in responding to this appeal. Attorneys1 fees are
appropriately awarded when an appeal taken is frivolous.
Utah Ct. App. 33(a).

R.

For purposes of Rule 33(a), a "frivolous

appeal" is one having no reasonable legal or factual basis,
that is, one that is not well grounded in fact or warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987).
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O'Brien v. Rush,

Beehive has made no effort to support its contentions
on appeal.

Beehive cites no legal authority to support its

position on the merits of claims before the Court, and Points
IV and V of Beehive's argument have no basis in the factual
record.

Beehivefs claims are not only without merit but are

also without basis in law and fact.

Robinson therefore is

entitled to the benefit of Rule 33(a).
CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly granted Robinson's motion
for summary judgments holding that Beehive's claims were barred
as a matter of law.

The Judgment of the District Court should

be affirmed in its entirety.

Moreover9 inasmuch as Beehive's

claims are without merit and without basis in law or fact, this
Court should award Robinson attorneys' fees incurred in
responding to this appeal.
DATED this / ^

day of February, 1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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Kathryn H. Snedaker
Attorneys for Respondent
50 South Main, Suite 1600
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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